The founder of Sunn legal hermeneutics in Vishanoff's view was al-Sh fi in his famous Ris la at the beginning of the 3 rd /9 th century. Before that time some hermeneutical concepts had been developed in the disciplines of Qur nic exegesis, theology and law, but no comprehensive hermeneutical theory for the interpretation of revealed texts, Qur n as well as Sunna. Together with his theory of an Islamic law based entirely on revealed texts, al-Sh fi elaborated a hermeneutics for the interpretation of these texts that recognized both their ambiguity and their ultimate clarity and was flexible enough for "negotiating the problematic relationship between the evolving and contested discourse of positive law and an evolving and contested body of authoritative texts" (p. 61). Al-Sh fi 's project of negotiating the relationship between revealed texts and legal rules (of positive law) set the course for the development of classical legal theory, even though it developed further significantly in some aspects before it reached its classical form. /10 th century. Chapter 3 deals with scripturalists, who sought to base the religious law exclusively only on the Qur n. As their most important representative Ibn azm is chosen and thoroughly discussed by Vishanoff. Chapter 4 deals with the rationalist later Ba ran Mu tazila, with al-Q Abd al-Jabb r as their main representative. Chapter 5 is devoted to the Ash ariyya, who defended anti-Mu tazil traditionalist doctrine with rationalist argumentation. Vishanoff analyzes the legal and hermeneutical thought of al-B qill as their principal representative. In chapter 8 he discusses the hermeneutics of the anbal Ab Ya Ibn al-Farr , describing it as based on intuitive grasp of "performative speech" and as law-oriented like al-Sh fi 's hermeneutics, yet distinctive in not seeking to derive all Islamic law ultimately from the Qur n.
In the concluding chapter 7, the relevance of the predominance of al-Shafi 's law-oriented paradigm in Sunn legal theory to the contemporary Islamic legal discourse is discussed.
The book in general reflects penetrating thorough research and careful interpretation of a wide range of legal sources and secondary studies, and its major conclusions are set forth convincingly. The reaffirmation of the pivotal role of al-Sh fi 's al-Ris la in the conception and elaboration of mainstream Sunn legal theory against recent views questioning this role is to be appreciated. Both achievement and problematic of al-Sh fi 's hermeneutics within his legal theory are preceptively analyzed.
There are some inadequacies and errors in the treatment of legal and theological thought deviating from the mainstream. Only one point may be noted here. Vishanoff's recognition of scripturalism in the sense of exclusive adherence to the letter of the Qur n as a third division besides rationalism and traditionalism in early Islamic jurisprudence (see p. 37) is misleading. The basic division among early Muslim religious scholars, theologians as well as jurists, was between rationalists, who considered reason essentially capable of recognizing justice, good and evil, and thus as the ultimate judge of religious law and good conduct, and traditionalists who denied human reason any epistemological role in religious law. Scripturalism was not constitutive of a third separate division and was compatible with either traditionalism or rationalism. Chapter 3 on early scripturalists thus groups together legal scholars of entirely divergent outlook and background. The Kh rijites may be described as scripturalists since for historical reasons they insisted on strict literal compliance with the commandments of the Qur n. Yet the great majority of them, moderate Ib s as well as radicals, were basically traditionalists supporting the Sunna and relying on ad th. Only a minority inclined to the Mu tazila and rationalist interpretation of the law. The commandments and prohibitions of the Qur n were for the Kh rijites law in the strict sense, obligations (far ) enforced by legal sanctions. Sunna was generally understood in the original sense of the term as merely recommended, praiseworthy action and good conduct.
The Mu tazil al-Na m, on the other hand, was essentially a rationalist theologian. He viewed the law and good conduct as recognizable and definable by rational investigation and rejected the ad th-based Sunna both as full of contradictions and superfluous. He insisted on literal acceptance of Qur nic legislation without extending it by analogical reasoning because he considered it as part of scriptural revelation that was not amenable to rational interpretation and could not be integrated into the rational system of law. The later Ba ran Mu tazila, in contrast, endeavored to rationalize Qur nic legislation fully in the context of their rational legal thought. d al-I bah and the hiriyya are erroneously also classed by Vishanoff as scripturalists. They may properly be described as literalist in their strict adherence to the letter of the Qur n as well as the ad th-based Sunna and their rejection of any extension of the law by rational analogy. They were radically anti-rationalist traditionalists. The meaning of the term scripturalism should not be extended to cover ad th texts in addition to the holy Scripture, the Qur n. Vishanoff's criticism of Hallaq that he "misconstrued the hiriyya as traditionalists" (p. 106, n. 257) is inappropriate.
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